Copilot AI Governance

[!NOTE] Validated 2026-11-09 against a real Microsoft 365 test tenant, via an actual Invoke-Maester run. The run correctly Passed: none of 19 agent identities or blueprint principals holds a broad Graph write permission outside MT.1223's list. appRoleAssignments and oauth2PermissionGrants read and typed as expected, including consentType. The beta inheritedAppRoleAssignments and inheritedOauth2PermissionGrants navigation properties also read without error for all 11 agent identities, but every one came back empty in this tenant — so whether an inherited grant itself carries consentType is still unconfirmed live; the code's fallback (treat a missing consentType as admin-consented) hasn't been exercised against a non-empty case.

Maester's MT.1223 reports agent identities holding the twelve Microsoft Graph permissions on its privilege-escalation list. This test covers broad permissions outside that list, on agent identities and agent identity blueprint principals:

Severity	Condition
High	A high-privilege permission: Directory, RoleManagement, Application, AppRoleAssignment, Policy, User, Group, GroupMember, Domain or Organization ReadWrite permissions, or Mail.Send, Mail.ReadWrite, Sites.FullControl.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All, Files.ReadWrite.All, Directory.AccessAsUser.All, full_access_as_app.
Medium	Any other tenant-wide write permission (*.ReadWrite.All).

Application permissions (including ones agent identities inherit from their blueprint) and admin-consented delegated grants are both read. User-consented grants are MP.AIGOV.1019. The high-privilege list is chadmcox/Copilot's, not Microsoft's: Microsoft's guidance is least privilege, with no fixed list.

Remediation action

Replace each permission with a narrower one (for example a .Selected or read-only scope), or remove it. Change permissions on the blueprint principal when every agent from that blueprint has them.

Related links

• Microsoft Graph permissions reference
• Agent identity blueprints

%TestResult%